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Bradman squinted or flinched when a ball was pitched high into
his body. So Jardine decided to tap into this apparent weakness
by planning to employ “Fast Leg Theory”, which later became
known as Bodyline.
Fast leg theory aimed to have the fast bowlers attacking the leg
stump of the batsman. The captain would then stack the leg
side of the field. The batsman was then faced with a choice. He
could hit the ball to the leg side, but would rarely break the line
of fielders. Or he could try to hit the ball to the unprotected
offside, a risk because he would have to step away from the
stumps to play across his body.
The subsequent mythology has Jardine himself inventing the
tactic to gain an unfair advantage over Australia’s golden boy. In
fact, fast leg theory had been around for years and many county
games had seen it employed.
Jardine’s variation of the tactic was much more devastating
for one reason. This was the man employed to hurl it in at
Bradman’s chest. Harold Larwood was extremely fast and
unerringly accurate. He hit the pitch hard and the ball would
rear up viciously.
Australian pitches appear to have changed in their natures
between this series and the previous, so the quicks were getting
much more action. Another myth surrounding the series was
that Jardine exclusively used the fast leg theory. This is not the
case. Bradman did not play in the first test due to an argument
with the Australian Cricket Board, and England managed a 10
wicket win without even using the tactic.
Once Bradman was back, bodyline was employed in the second
test. Australia leveled the series, but it was the third test at
Adelaide that really brought the heat. After Oldfield’s fractured
skull, the ACB sent a telegram to the Marlborough Cricket
Council, English cricket’s power brokers. They complained
that bodyline was “unsportsmanlike” and should be shelved
immediately. The MCC archly dismissed the complaint, saying
that they saw nothing wrong with Jardine’s tactics but would
abandon the test series if Australia was dissatisfied. The ACB
backed down, knowing that a cancelled test series would cost
them considerable revenue.
The series ended 4-1 to England, as Jardine continued to
employ fast leg theory intermittently in the final three tests. The
controversy rumbled on, and even the governments of the two
countries got involved in the war of words. Many of the players
chose to take blows to the upper body rather than give up their
wickets, which further enhanced their reputation as Australian
heroes, in contrast to the unfair tactics of England. Bradman,
a much wilier batsman, dodged the short pitched deliveries
and exposed his stumps to get the ball away on the off side. A
smaller man, he sacrificed runs to save his body. He ended the
series with an average of 56.57, the worst of his career: numbers
most batsmen would be proud of.
By the end of the series, the MCC came to see the damage the
series had done to the reputation of English cricket. Jardine
never captained the country against Australia again, and they
gradually instigated rule changes that would prevent stacking
the leg side and would limit the number of short-pitched
deliveries a bowler could send down. Harold Larwood was the
most glaring victim of bodyline’s fall out: he never played for
England again. A gifted bowler merely following his captain’s
orders, he was restricted to county matches and eventually
moved to, of all places, Australia.
Bodyline’s legacy is part of the Australian self-concept. It
happened at one of those moments in history when a nation’s
identity is malleable and helped the country differentiate itself
from its forebear. No other Ashes series can come close to its
acrimony, just as no other series will ever be quite as broadly
significant.
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ISSUE 21 | AUGUST 2015 |
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